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United States
of America

Vol. 117

Q:ongrrssional1Rccord
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE

92 d

CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 1971

No. 54

Senate
DRUG ABUSE IN THE MIT.ITARY
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, inasmuch
as the distinguished majority leader was
speaking of "fragging" in South Vietnam,
I would like to continue in that context
for just a few minutes before I begin
with the statement I prepared for this
period.
As I listened to the distinguished
majority leader this morning note the
209 reported incidents of last year in
Vietnam, and later we developed in
colloquy the fact that this figure undoubtedly did not include any of those
incidents which may have taken place
under actual combat conditions or conditions where combat troops were other
than outer perimeter or central defensive
troops, the thought occurred to me that
in the study I am presenting this morning on drug dependence and drug use
ln the mllitary we wUI see the causes
behind many of those incidents of
fragging or assassinations of American
officers by others in the military, regardless of the circumstances.
Mr. President, I herewith transmit to
the Senate a comprehensive report on
drug abuse in the Armed Forces prepared by the staff of the Special Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics
of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare. I ask unanimous consent that
the report be printed in the RECORD at
the conclusion of my remarks as exhibit 2.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
<See exhibit 2.)
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, this report is the result of an extended study
by the subcommittee which began a year
ago with the approval of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on
Armed Service~, Senator JOHN STENNIS,
and the distinguished ranking m1n0l;ty
member of that committee, Senator MARCARET CHASE SMITH.
The report does not purport to be an
indepth analysis and investigation of
this very large and complicated subject
field. It is, rather. an inclusive, preliminary, base-level survey. Its tone is dispassionate and objective, reflecting a
conscientious, bipartisan effort on the
part of the staff. It represents, I believe, a valuable and necessary first step
in realistically facing a very large and
compelling national problem.

I believe no one can read this report,
low keyed as it is, without feeling the
urgency, the magnitude, the pervasiveness, and the peril of the infiltration of
our Armed Forces by the drug epidemic
prevalent throughout our civilian society.
The report will be used primarily as a
working tool in discussions with the appropriate military authorities to identify
those actions which can be taken under
existing administrative framework and
those that may require legislation for
achieving solutions. The primary intent
of the subcommittee from the beginning
has been to explore a serious problem
and to help find effective remedies for it,
not to sensationalize the subject matter
or to try to affix blame. Our approach is
from the health standpoint, rather than
from the law enforcement standpoint,
although in some respects the two approaches overlap somewhat.
Mr. President, in all fairness, it must
be recognized that the sudden explosion
of the drug epidemic in our armed services, as in our civilian society, was not
foreseen. The Armed Forces were understandably not equipped to handle it. The
principal business of an army is to fi~~:ht,
not to treat and reh31bilitate drug addicts.
Yet, the problem is upon us and the
Armed Forces, like the rest of our society,
must face it realistically. And here we
are talking about a matter that has a
profound bearing on our national security as well as on the health of the personnel involved and the well-being of
the civilian society to which they will
eventually return.
The dilemma our military leadership
faces is the same dilemma that confounds the civilian sector of American
society. That dilemma fiows from a conflict between laws based on traditional
moralistic attitudes and, on the other
hand, a very real American desire to aid
the afflicted. Boiled down to its simplest
terms, that dilemma is this: Shall the
per5"on who abuses drugs be treated punitively or as someone who needs help?
In a limited attempt to resolve that
question, the Defense Department last
October authorized the military services
to establish amnesty programs on a
trial basis. Essentially, this policy permits the individual services to offer treatment without punishment to any drug
user who asks for it.

So far. only the Army and the Air
Force have adopted implementing policies. Neither is consistent with the other.
Indeed, as the distinguished Senator
from Pennsylvania ('Mr. SCHWEIKER)
has pointed out, the Army policy permits
a unit commander to determine in the
final analysis whether to execute the
policy. The Air Force policy-much in
the pattern of its po!.icy toward alcoholics-seems to discourage those of its
members on flying status or in sensitive
positions from even volunteering for
treatment.
Although 6 months have elapsed since
the Defense Department amnesty policy was announced. the Navy and the Marine Corps have not yet implemented it.
I understand that such a policy instruction in draft form, however, is working
its way through the Pentagon mills.
My primary recommendation, therefore, is that the Defense Department
should establish a comprehensive, integrated, and mandatory policy under
which service members who are drug dependent or who are medically ill drug
abusers are provided the same opportunity for treatment and rehabilitation as
would be afforded to any military person
who is ill.
Such a policy would include the following principles:
First. A member who is a medically ill
drug abuser or a drug dependent person
should be summarily discharged from the
service only if he has refused to accept
appropriate treatment as shall be offered
by the service.
Second. A member who is identified as
a drug dependent person or a medically
ill drug abuser as a result of his arrest
for a drug-related offense should be dealt
with through normal military judicial or
disciplinary processes. In determining
how to handle an individual case, primary emphasis should be given to how
best to treat a:nd rehabilitate the individual. It may be useful, for example, to
consider postponement of the trial or disciplinary proceeding, suspension of sentence, or other devices commonly used in
civilian courts in order to effect rehabilitation.
Third. A member with drug abuse or

-2drug dependence problems should be encouraged to seek medical or other assistance and, when he does so, should not
be subject to disciplinary or other punitive action-administrative or otherwise-based on information he has given
in seeking or receiving such assistance.
The military does not now recognize confidentiality in the doctor-patient relationship. Under this recommendation,
absolute confidentiality would be preserved unless competent medical authority determines that the patient is a danger to himself or others; however, no
information divulged by the patient in
confidence should be admitted into evidence in disciplinary proceedings against
him without his consent.
Fourth. A member who seeks such assistance should be offered every opportunity to be restored to useful military
service with. the Armed Forces. Th.is contemplates that such persons may be offered temporary sick leave or given tasks
they are capable of performing while
undergoing treatment and rehabilitation.
Fifth. When security clearance, flying
status, or other classification affecting
job position or pay is withdrawn from a
member who sought assistance as a drug
dependent pe-rson or as a medically ill
drug abuser. it should be reinstated
within 6 months after his treatment has
been completed unless he fails during
th.is period to perform at the level at
which he was performing prior to his
request for treatment.
Sixth. A member who has sought or
accepted treatment and rehabilitation
should be separated only when such
treatment and rehabilitation has repeatedly failed and competent medical
authority has determined that he cannot be restored to useful military service.
These, Mr. President, are some recommendations I would make in the treatment and rehabilitation area. But there
are other problem areas demanding attention if we are to prevent present and
future generations of military personnel
from abusing drugs and if we are to bring
into treatment programs those who already have drug problems no matter
where they surface in the military system.
One finding in the staff report is that
a significant proportion of drug users, including those on "hard" drugs, are being
admitted to the service because of inadequate preinduction screening. In my
opinion, the Armed Forces should not
only give special priority to developing
reliable methods of identfying actual and
potential drug abusers at this point in
the system; they should also create a
mechanism whereby those rejected for
military service because of drug problems are referred, with their consent, to
civilian prevention and treatment facilities.
It is also clear from the report that the
military's drug abuse prevention-education programs have failed to teach commanders -to understand the causes of
drug abuse among their troops or how to
deal with it in other than a punitive way.
These programs have also failed to
motivate service personnel effectively
against the use of dru~s.
I recommend that the Armed Forces-

in consultation with the Office of Education the National Institute of Mental
Heaith, the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, and outside expertscarry out a massive upgrading of its
present prevention and 'educational efforts with the objectives I have outlined
in mind.
These efforts should present factual
information in an unbiased way, encourage individual discussion and participation, and include discussions both
of alcohol and alcoholism together w1th
nonchemical alternatives to drug use
and abuse. It is extremely important that
these efforts reach every level of the military structure-commanders as well as
troops.
In some segmEnts of the Armed Forces,
special traveling drug abuse teams with
expertise in effective educational techniques and with knowledge of the legal,
medical, and social ramifications of drug
use and abuse are already being used effectively. These teams should be given
additional support, and th.is program
should be expanded.
PerhaPG most importantly in the prevention area, the Armed Forces should
give greater attention to providing more
recreation, entertainment, physical activity and meaningful work in order to
abate those conditions-particularly
boredom and "make work" jobs-which
appear to be conducive to drug abuse.
This need is already apparent among
our troops in Germany, and it is becoming increasingly apparent in Southeast
Asia where many towns are off limits,
our troops have less to do, and a vast assortment of potent drugs-marihuana,
virtually pure heroin, stimulants, and depressants-are readily and inexpensively
available.
In the traini~ area, two categories of
military personnel demand special attention. One group, as I have indicated, includes those involved in screening candidates for induction into the Armed
Forces. The other group includes those
who are involved in day-to-day interpersonal dealings with drug abuse problems-unit commanders, noncommissioned officers, chaplains, medical and social workers, law enforcement personnel,
and the like. Both of these grouPG require specialized training not only in
detecting actual and potential drug abusers but, more importantly. in dealing effectivelY and humanely with the consequences of their abuse.
As for those drug dependent individuals or medically ill drug abusers who
are separated from service for those reasons, I propose that they be granted a
nonpunitive discharge and be afforded
the same opportunities for treatment and
rehabilitation afforded all persons discharged as physically or mentally disabled. Their drug-related actions should
be not regarded as the result of intentional misconduct or willful neglect. In
th.is connection, the Veterans' Administration should give priority to increasing its capacity to care for drug-dependent persons or medically ill drug
abusers.
These are the highlights of my own
recommendations. I have a more detailed
list. and I ask unanimous consent that

this list be printed in the RECORD at the
conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
<See exhibit u
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, the drug
epidemic has reached a point that is no
longer acceptable in our civilian society.
It is even more unacceptable in the
armed services entrusted with the defense of our country.
As the report shows, the subcommittee
staff did not find factual evidence that
would establish drug usage as a significant factor in actual combat. In Vietnam, commanders told the staff that, because of the personal danger involved,
there was far less smoking of marihuana
in combat areas than in rear support
areas. Yet, some studies indicate a positive correlation between marihuana usage and combat exposure. In any event,
one cannot believe there is anything less
than immense danger in the use of dangerous drugs in a war theater, as we have
heard stated on the floor of the Senate
today.
After all, this is a guerrilla war, a war
of infiltration in which the ambush and
the booby trap figure largely. A lapse of
vigilance or judgment could easily mean
the loss of lif~ven in rear support
areas.
We know the relationship between violence and drug addiction here at home.
While no reliable studies on the relation
of drug abuse and violence in battle areas
are available, there is ample reason to
believe there is a close tie.
While we have no hard evidence that
drug abuse contributed to such incidents
as My Lai, there is that possibility.
Press reports carry stories, one of
which has been elcquently presented here
this morning, of widespread "fragging"
in Vietnam-the assassination of American officers by our own troops in the
field. If a man will go to the extent of
rolling a fragmentation bomb under the
flap of an officer's tent, it is reasonable
to suspect that drugs may and probably
do figure in the story in some way.
Finally, :we have the hideous picture
before us of men, inured to violence and
addicted to drugs, returning to civilian
society from the war area compelled to
use the skills of violence they have
learned as soldiers in criminals acts here
at home in order to support their habit.
Mr. President, I believe it is imperative that strong measures be taken to
stem the rapidly growing drug epidemic
in our armed services. I believe the
Armed Forces are in a unique position to
move out on this and to assert national
leadership in the drug abuse prevention,
control, treatment, and rehabilitation
field. I feel confident that we in Congress will give them our full support in
these endeavors. It is mv hope that the
public release today of this staff report
will encourage t hose in the highest positions of our military leadership to accept
the challenge, will encourage those of us
in the Congress of the United States to
support the mihtary leadership in the
initiation of programs that are absolutely
essential to the military of this country,
and will encourage us to take those actions legislatively that can undergird

-3and support, so that we can begin to
alleviate the great dangers from these
problems.
Mr. President, there are many ways
in which we can begin. Just a few weeks
ago, for example, I had the opportunity
to stop by the Glasgow Air Force Base
in Montana, where there are excellent
facilities for long-term usage, fully and
completely built, with excellent hospital facilities already existing, yet
standing idle. We are talking about the
need for long-range of rehabilitation
and treatment, and for feeding back into
our society those men who are the responsibility of our society, and have
served our country in combat. Certainly,
at this critical time, we must not be
said to lack the irutiative to acce·p t ·the
challenge or the innovative ability to
adopt the programs that can begin to
resolve these issues.
EXHIBIT 1
IDENTIFICATION OF DRUG ABUSERS
DEPENDENT PERSONS

AND DRUG

The Armed Forces should give special priority to developing reliable methods of Identifying drug abusers and potential drug_
abusers at the Armed Forces Examining and
Entrance Stations and elsewhere In the military system.
The GeneJ;tll Accounting Office (GAO)
shoUld be asked to undertake a study to determine whether entrance examinations can
and should be made more effective In screenIng out drug abusers and those who are prone
to drug abuse. Such a study shoUld Include
an analysis of the techniques which can be
used to screen such Individuals, a cost-benefit
analysis of such techniques, and recommendations of those techniques which can
and should be used by the Armed Forces.
Ind.! victuals who are rejected for service In
the Armed Forces because of drug abuse or
drug dependence should, with their consent,
be referred to appropriate civilian prevention
and treatment facilities. This would apply to
candidates for Induction as well as to In-servIce personnel.
The Armed Forces should establish a system for evaluating the performance of each
AFEES station In screening out drug abusers.
Such a system should seek to Identify those
AFEES stations where significant numbers
of Individuals have been admitted to service
with undetected drug abuse and drug dependence problems which subsequently Interfere with their military performance.
P~VENTION

The Armed Forces, In consultation with the
Office of Education, the National Institute of
Mental Health, the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, and outside experts, should
carry out a massive upgrading of Its present
efforts toward preventing and educating
against drug abuse and drug dependence.
These efforts should present factual Information In an unbiased way, encourage Individual discussion and participation, Include
discussions of alcohol abuse and alcoholtsm,
and Include discussions of non-chemical alternatives to drug use and abuse. It Is extremely Important that these efforts be
tailored to and reach each level of the military structure.
Special traveling drug abuse teams with
expertise In effective educational techniques
and a knowledge of legal, medical and social
ramifications of drug use and abuse are being
effectively In some segments of the Armed
Forces. Additional support should be given to
these teams, and this program should be
expanded.
The Armed Forces should give greater attention to providing more recreation, entertainment, physical activity and meaningful

work In order to abate those condl tlons,
particularly boredom and "make work" jobs,
which appear to be conductive to drug abuse.
An Intensive evaluation of au prevention
efforts In this area should be carried out to
Insure their effectiveness.
TRATNING

Specialized Information and training In the
recognition of drug abuse and drug depend ence should be provided to personnel Involved In screening candidates for Induction
Into the Armed Forces.
Additional emphasis shoUld be given to
providing specialized Information and trainIng to personnel Involved In dealing with
drug abuse problems, Including unit commanders, noncommissioned officers, chaplains, medical and social work personnel, law
enforcement personnel and the like.
· An In tens! ve eva!uatlon of all training efforts In this area should be earned out In
order to Insure their effectiveness.
TREATMENT

AND

REHABILITATION

A. The Defense Department should establlsh a comprehensive, Integrated, and mandatory policy under which service members
who are c!rUg dependent or are med.lcally Ill
drug abusers are provided with the same opportunities for treatment and rehabilitation
as would be afforded to any military personnel who are Ill. Such a policy should Include
the following principles:
.
1. A member who Is a medically Ill drug
abuser or a drug dependent person shoUld
not be summarily discharged from the servIce, unless he has refused to accept appropriate treatment as shall be offered by the
service.
2. A member who Is Identified as a drug
dependent person or a medically Ill drug
abuser as a resuJ t a! his arrest for a drugrelated offense, should be dealt with through
normal military j ud icial or disciplinary processes. In determining how to handle an Individual case, primary emphasis should be
given to how best to treat and rehabilitate
the Individual. It may be useful, for example, to consider postponement of the trial
or disciplinary proceeding, suspension of sentence, and other devices commonly used In
civilian courts In order to effect rehabilitation.
·
3. A member with drug abuse or drug dependence problems should be encouraged to
seek medical assistance and, when he does so,
should not be subject to disciplinary or other
punitive action based on fnformatlon he has
given In seeking or receiving such assistance.
Absolute confidentiality should be preserved
unless competent medical authority determines that the patient ls a danger to himself or others; however, no Information divulged by the patient In confidence should
be admitted Into evidence 1n disciplinary
proceedings against him without his consent.
4. A member who seeks such assistance
should be offered every opportunity to be
restored to useful military service wLthln the
Armed Forces. This contemplates that such
person may be offered temporary sick leave
or given tasks they are capable of performIng while undergoing treatment and rehab111tatlon.
5. When security clearance, flying stat us
or other classification affecting job position
or pay Is withdrawn from a member who
sought assistance as a drug i!ependent person or a medically 111 drug abuser, It should
be reinstated within six months after his
treatment has been completed unless he
fans during this period to perform at the
level at which he was performing prior to
treatment.
6. r.. member who has sought or accepted
treatment and rehabilitation should be separated only when such treatment and rehabilitation has r epeatedly failed and competent medical authority has determined
that he cannot be restored to use!ul mJUtary
service.

B. The present amnesty program should
be totally re-evaluated In the light of the
above principles and objectives.
C. A study shoUld be carried out to determine whether treatment and reha.bllltatlon
efforts should be carried out In Armed Forceswide central t r eatment facilities or, rather.
In local settings.
SEPARATION

A member who Is a medically 111 drug
abuser or a drug dependent person should
be granted a non-punitive discharge and
shoUld be afforded the same opportunities
for treatment and rehab1lltatlon afforded all
persons discharged as physically or mentally
disabled. His drug-related actions should not
be regarded as the result of Intentional misconduct or willfUl neglect. Such a person
shoUld retain the same rights and benefits
as any other person afflicted with serious 111nesses, and should not Jose pension, retirement, medical or other rights because he
Is a medically Ill drug abuser or a drug dependent person.
The Veterans Administration should give
priority to Increasing Its capab1llty to care
for drug dependent persons or medically 111
drug )l.busers. In doing so, It should consider
entering Into contractual arrangements with
such facilities as have demonstrated their effectiveness In the treatment and rehabilitation area.
MISCELLANEOUS

In general, the Armed Forces should recognize their unique poeltlon to assert national
leadership In Identifying drug abusers and
drug dependent persons; In developing and
evaluating effective treatment and rehabilitation, research, prevention and education
programs; and making a distinct contribution toward the abatement of this national
problem.
The Armed Forces shoUld consider ways
by which they can have an affirmative Impact on the abatement of the drug epidemic
In clv1llan society. The most obvious contributions would lrtclude sharing Information and data relevant to the drug problem,
and the donation or sale at present value of
surplus equipment, fac1lltles and the like
that might be useful In combatting the drug
problem.
The Armed Forces shoUld establish a special program to provide prevention, treatment and rehab1lltatlon services to dependents of m1lltary personnel.
.
Special consldera tton should be glven to
Insuring that continuity Is preserved In all
prevention and treatment and rehabilitation
programs. This should apply to personnel
operating these programs. It shoUld also apply to those receiving tpe benefits of treatment and rehabilitation programs.
The Congress should authorize and appropriate sufficient funds to carry out the
above recommendations.
A special lmpact~d aid program should
be created to assist communities whose drug
problem has been aggravated by the prevalence of drug abuse among military personnel stationed nearby.
The Armed Forces should provide written
reports, at six-month Intervals, on their
progress toward achieving the objectives
outlined above.
EXHIBIT

2

STAFF REPORT ON !DRUG ABUSE IN THE
MILITARY

To: Members of Alcoholism and Narcotics
Subcommittee.
From: The SubcommJttee Staff.
I. INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1970, the Subcommittee
staff began an Investigation of drug abuse In
the military. This was undertaken by authority of an Apr11 16, 1970, letter !rom
'senator John C. Stennis, Chairman o! the
Armed Services Committee, to Senator

-4Hughes, Chairman of the Subcommittee, as
well as under the Subcommittee's own authority to act In the drug abuse ~~orea. The
objectives of the Investigation were to explore: the extent and nature of drug and
alcohol abuse In the military; the Impact
which this abuse Is having upon Individuals,
the armed services, and American society as
a whole; the measures, particularly In the
areas of education, treatment, and rehabilitation, which the military Is taking to meet
the problem; and the areas In which further
Investigation or action might be taken.
In carrying out the Investigation the members of the staff attempted to cover the problem from two approaches. First, we attempted
to look at the problem from a geographical
point of view. We looked at stateside bases
(primarily In the Eastern United States},
Southeast Asia and the Far East (Hong
Kong, Thailand, South VIetnam, Japan, and
Korea}, and Europe (Germany and England}.
We visited Southeast Asia and the Far East
In September, 1970, and Europe In January,
1971. In order to cover the broadest possible
ground In the short time we had available,
we split Into teams In both Southeast Asia
and Europe.
Second, the staff also attempted to visit
examples or Installations covering the entire
raage of the military system: Induction,
basic training, advanced training, support
troops, and combat troops (In the field and
returnees}. We concentrated primarily on the
Army for two reasons: It has the largest
number or personnel and It has nearly all
ot the draftees. However, In Southeast Asia
and Europe, we also looked at the other
branches In the same environment to determine what contrast, If any, we would find.
Members at the staff were: Southeast Asia:
Robert 0. Harris, Staff Director; Wade Clarke,
Majority Counsel; Julian Granger, stat!' Investigator; Richard J. Wise, Minority Counsel, and Jay B. Cutler, Mlmority Counsel. In
Europe the above were joined by Nlk Edes
or Senator Williams' staff.
Our primary method of investigation was
dlscusslon with and oonectlon of data from
the members or command at each !aclllty
visited. At virtually every Installation, we
dlscussed the problems with groups composed or co=nd personnel, the provost
marshal, the medical officer, the judge advocate, the chaplain, and, on occasion, the
tn!ormrutlon officer. In moot installations,
command relied moot heavily on the data
supplied by the provost marshal and the
medical officer to answer our questions. This
data does not give an accurate picture of
either the extent of use or the nature of
use, but It Is the best available In most command situations. In addition to command
discussions, we attempted, where possible,
and within the limited time available, to
Interview Individual enlisted men and junior
officers. We also collected data In written and
oral form from other agencies and lndl vldua!s associated with the military.
On all or our visits we made It clear to
those contacted that we were Interested tn
low key, Informal discussion and that our
primary lnt<·rest was In the health and prevention aspects or the problem. The staff
believes that this allayed some or the rears
that we were attempting to gather data tar
an expose or criticism of the military and
Increased the cooperation we received, particularly !rom the Army. In general we were
satisfied with the truthfulness or thooe we
contacted. The Army was more realistic tn
assessing their problem. They seemed more
w1111ng to recognize drug abuse as a problem
and to take action both to prevent It and
to alleviate Its effects. In this regard, we
would rate the other services In the followIng order: the Air Force, the Navy, and the
Marines.
What follows Is a synthesis by the staff o!
Its findings and recommendations based
upon Its investigation.

II.

THE

NATURE

AND

EXTENT

OF

DRUG

USE

The staff has attempted to ascertain who
the military drug users are; how many of
them there are, where they use their drugs,
what drugs they use, when they tend to use
drugs, and why they use drugs. While we
make some conclusions about these factors,
they are by no means a.ppllca.ble to all mllltary drug users. The nature or drug use, the
circumstances of use and the reasons for use
vary widely. However, the generalizations
which we do draw lndlcate the direction In
which drug abuse appears to be going a.nd
suggest the areas In w.b.lch further action
might be taken In order to meet the drug
abuse crisis.
A. The users: Who and how many

There Is a paucity of hard data on which
to base an authoritative finding or the extent
of drug use In the military. The few studies
w'h1ch exist have been made exclusively
among Army populations and are severely
!lmlted both In numbers and In scope. This
void was recognized when Department of Defense witnesses disclosed plans for ' a worldwide epidemiological survey of drug use
among all members of the armed forces, to be
undertaken this year.
Nevertheless, certain Insights may be
gained from the available studies. It should
be noted that these studies generally reveal
drug use of a greater amount than do the
medlcal and law enforcement figures given
the staff. However, they seem to be lower
than the subjective assessments or command
particularly at junior levels. Among those
studies most heavily re!led upon In this report ·(all cited In the hearings record) are
the following: ( 1} Patterns of Drug Use: A
Study of 5,482 Subjects, by Black, Owens and
Wolff, Fort S111, Oklahoma, 1970; (2} Drug
Use In VIetnam-A Survey Among Army Personnel In the Two Northern Corps, Stanton,
1969; (3} Marihuana. In VIetnam: A Survey o!
Use Among Army Enlisted Men In the Two
Southern Corps, Roffman and Sapo!, 1967;
(4} Marihuana In a. Tactical Unit In Vietnam,
Treanor and Skrlpol, 1970; (5} Marihuana
Use In VIetnam: A Prellminary Study, 1968;
and (6} A Study o! Marihuana and Opiate
Use In the 82nd Airborne Division, 1969. 0!
these, only the Stanton and Treanor-Skrlpol
studies used samples which Included both
officers and en!lsted men; the others concentrated on en!lsted men In the lower ranks.
Patterns of drug use shown by the most
recent studies seem to be conslsten t w1 th the
findings from what Is considered to be the
most scientifically valld study or them all,
the one by Stanton. He grouped nonusers,
(1-20 times used}, heavy users (21-199 times
used}, and habituated users (200 or more
times used}. He also sampled both Incoming
and outgoing troops. Overall, he found that
53.2 percent or enllsted men had used marihuana at least once In their !lves. He also
found a trend toward more frequent usage In
VIetnam than had been reported two years
ear!ler. or the 50.1 percent who reported
t>slng marihuana In VIetnam, 20.5 percent
were casual users, 11.9 percent were heavy
users, and 17.7 percent were habituated
users; In other words, heavy and habituated
users were more numerous than casual users.
Patterns or other drug use which Stanton
round among soldlers leaving Veltnam Included the following: (1} opium use was
reported by 17.4 percent (9.8 percent casual
users, 5.8 percent heavy users, 1.8 percent
habituated users}; (2} amphetamine use was
reported by 16.2 percent ( 11 percent casual
users, 4 percent heavy users, 1.2 percent
habituated users}; (3} barbiturate use was
reported by 11.6 percent (7.8 percen.t casual
users, 2.7 percent heavy users, 1.1 habituated
users}; (4} heroin/ morphine use was reported by 2.2 percent ( 1.4 percent casual
users, .6 percent heavy users, .2 percent
habituated users}; (5} acid (LSD, STP) use
was reported by 5.3 percent (3.2 percent

casual users, 1.6 percent heavy users, .5 percent habituated users}.
In general, It can be concluded !rom all
these studies that drug use, a.t least among
Army members, has been Increasing with the
passage of years since 19£7, when the first
study was conducted, and that a growing proportion of servicemen are entering the service
with a history or drug use.
There Is no pure stereotype o! the drug
user In the mllltary, just as there ta none In
clvlllan society. Whlle the great bulk of drug
abusers are enllsted men or lower rank between the ages or 18 and 26, users may also
be found In the non-commissioned and commissioned officer ranks; for example, a heroinhooked sergeant at Fort Bragg was "the outstan.dlng N'OO In his company" or ·a colonel
In VIetnam who became a "speed freak" from
taking amphetamines to stay awake on long
patrols and then used other drugs to get to
sleep. Whlle these extremes do exist, the age
group or the typical user Is much the sa.me as
It Is In clvlllan society.
From the studles and from our on-site Investigation we _would ascribe the following
characteristics to most drug abusers In the
mllltary: age 19-22, rank E-4 or below, unmarried, less than high school graduate,
either draftee or non-career oriented enlistee,
equally from field or support units on tlr8t
overseas tour.
Other factors seem to be present fn those
who become regular or habituated users.
These persons are generally from broken
homes, have a lower education (are high
school drop-outs}, have Insufficient persona.!ltles to deal with their fears nnd stress (passive-aggressive personalltles, Immature, 6ltuatlonal adjustment problems, low-selfesteem, lack o! long-term ambitions, etc.}
and are Jlkely to become Involved In other
behavioral problems within the military society. In VIetnam, we were told that nearly
all of the arrests for drug offenses were Incidental to arrests for other violations, such
as uniform violation, curfew violation, offlimitS violations, etc. The cases which required med!ca.l treatment usually were those
with these kinds or negative ·b ehavior patterns and with psychological problems which
went beyond their drug use. At Fort Dlx, New
Jersey, many of those who were being held
In the Special Processing Detachment were
also drug abusers. The Special Processing
Detachment Is primarily a holdlng unit for
Individuals apprehended anywhere along the
East Coast for being AWOL. They are sent
to Fort Dlx untll their records ca.n be located
and their proper unit determined.
This tndlvidual who Is going to become a
habitual user or drugs and who Is going to
become a. problem for the mll1tary-1n either
medical or dlsclpllna.ry terms-Is an Individual who has personallty problems sumctently
serious that he would llkely become a problem In whatever societal structure he Is ln.
It shou1d be emphasized that the drug
user-particularly the heavy user-Is likely
to be a member or a peer group or sub-cultural group In which the taking of drugs
plays an Important role. For example, we
were told that In Germany most arrests for
drug abuse were made In groups. These arrests by the Criminal Investigation Division were usually the result or the Infiltration of a group by an agent and when the
arrests were made the entire group was
taken.
The sub-culture Is best Ulustrated by the
experience at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.
There the drug users leave the post to congregate In pads rented by small groups for
the purpose or off-duty relaxation through
drugs. These pads are characterized by psychedellc decorations, acid rock music, and
by the mod dress or the participants. we
were also told In several places that the figures on the extent or use were distorted depending upon which group a.n Individual
trooper belonged to. If the person questioned

-5was a non-user, he associated with other
non-users and tended to view all use In
terms o! his group; his estimates were usu ally Jow. The user on the other hand associated with other users and tended to feel
that everyone used drugs.
B. The drugs being used

The kinds of drugs being used In any particular area depend to a large degree upon
the extent to which they are locally available. In Thailand and VIetnam, there are
few effective controls on the avaUablllty of
any drug. Because of a lack of doctors,
apothecary shops dispense virtually every
manufactured drug and many herbs and
other types of remedies. These are dispensed
without a prescription to any buyer. Also In
Thailand and VIetnam, as In most Southeast
Asia nations, opium, particularly among the
Chinese populations, has been the drug of
choice of the natives. This and Its derivatives, morphine and heroin, were reportedly
supplied primarily by an organized network
of Chinese operating In nearly all nations.
In VIetnam and Thailand marihuana w><s
freely avaUable. In ThaUand, the members
of the staff had no dlfficul ty In procuring
"taUored" marihuana cigarettes with filtertips. These cost $1.50 for 15. In the United
States a similar amount would cost at least
five times as much. They can be procured
from or through bar girls, taxi drivers, and
even young chUdren on the street. In Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, we were shown
apothecary shops which dispense the varIous amphetamines and barbiturates which
some Air Force troops use. These were small
shops with an open front and shelves loaded
with bottles and jars. Drugs were dispensed
either by name or by describing a set of
symptoms which Jed the shopkeeper to dispense whatever he felt would solve the problem.
The Southeast Asia marihuana Is fresh and
potent. Delta 9 Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)
Is the active Ingredient In marihuana. The
average sample available In Southeast Asia
contains between 3.5 and 4.0 percent THC.
This Is much higher than the average Y, to
% of one percent THC which U.S.-grown
marihuana contains. The preference for marihuana In Southeast Asia among U.S. troops
Is ascribed to ready avallab111ty, Inexpensiveness, ease of cachement, non-addlctlveness
and the quality of the Intoxication produced.
Stanton found a growing trend among
u.s. troops In VIetnam toward the use of
opium. This Is available In liquid or powdered
form. Among the departing enlisted men In
his sample, only 6.3 percent reported having
used· opium before their arrival but 17.4 percent reported use upon leaving. However,
the question has been raised as to whether
these troops really know what they were
using was opium. We also heard of opium
being available In the form of "OJ's"-marlhuana cigarettes dipped In liquid opium.
Stanton's 17.4 percentage figure for opium
use In VIetnam places that drug ahead of
amphetamines, or "speed," In popularity
among the troops. The Incidence of amphetamine use among outgoing enlisted men was
16.2 percent, up from 12.4 percent usage before their arrival In VIetnam. Barbiturates
were favored by 11.6 percent. Other drugs
used were heroin, morphine and "acid" (LSD,
STP), with the use of "acid" actually showIng a drop In the before and after figures.
We were regularly Informed that there was
an Increase In the avallabUity, experimentation with, and use of heroin. There seemed
to be an Increase In the hospitalizations for
heroin withdrawal. Heroin Is available In
two forms : "Red Rock" heroin from Thailand
(reportedly brought to VIetnam by Thai
troops) and refined heroin. Red Rock Is generally 3-4 percent heroin, 3-4 percent strychnine, and 32 percent caffeine. The refined
heroin Is In 100- and 300-mllllgram capsules
containing 97 percent heroin as compared to

the 5 or 6 percent heroin usually available In
the U.S.
The two most commonly used amphetamines come In liquid form. They are Maxitone Fo~te and Obesltol, both of French
manufacture. Maxltone Forte Is taken orally
mixed with Coke or used Intravenously.
Obesltol Is taken orally. The barbiturates
most commonly used In Southeast Asia are
Blnoctal and Amlnoctal, also of French
manufacture.
In Germany, there Is a plentiful supply of
hashish, amphetamines, and barbiturates,
and tJ.s. troops and their dependents have
easy and Inexpensive access to them. Hashish
Is by far the drug of choice and Is In widespread use. It Is reputedly brought In by
"guest wor ker" nationals from growing countries such as TUrkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon
and by a number of criminal syndicates. We
were told It Is distributed by German nationals, by American m111tary personnel and
former servicemen who were discharged In
Europ e. "Uppers" and "downers"-amphetamlne preparations, Llbrlum, Valium and
Darvon-may be purchased Inexpensively
over t'he counter, without prescription, In
any German drug store.
LSD Is also used In slgn11l.cant amounts by
troops In Germany. Thts ts either brought In
from the U.S. or made In Illicit laboratories
In Germany. We had very little tndlcatlon of
heroin or coca.tne use. Both the law enforcement pel'SOnnel and the medical personnel
had had very little contact with these drugs.
Regardless of location, marihuana and
hashish usually ts smoked In pipes or cigarette !onn. In VIetnam, the marihuana cigarettes are sometimes filled with Red Rock
heroin and amoked. The amphetamines and
barbiturates are generally taken orally but
occasionally they are Injected Intravenously.
Heroin Is generally smoked (sniffed) by beginners and Injected by heavy users.
It Is Important to note that most of the
regular or heavy users are multiple drug
users. They will substitute one drug for another It avallabutty Is a problem or wlll use
a variety of drugs to meet their emotional
needs. The takers of amphetamines will use
barbiturates to come down off their high.
Most of the users of hallucinogenic drugs
such as LSD or STP also used marihuana.

c.

When and where drugs are being used

It ts difficult to disagree with the Impression of an Army psych1atrlst who says
that "the use of drugs and alcohol can occur anywhere at any time." However, It Is our
general Impression that It Ia more likely to
occur on off-duty hours whether In the
United states or abroad. It Is also likely to
occur awo.y from the military post.
The most crucial question on time and
place of use concerns the use of drugs In
combat. In VIetnam, commanders universally
told the staff that, because of the personal
danger Involved, there was !e..r less smoking
of marihuana In combat areas than In rear
support aroos. The same wae stated by commanders to the Department of Defense Drug
Abuse Oontrol Committee Task Force headed
by Jerome A. Vacek of the Marine Corp.;
during Its vtslt there In the !all of 1970. We
were told that there was considerable selfpolicing among the troops while in combat
areas because they did not want to endanger
themselves or be endangered by another who
might be "high" at a crLtlca.l moment. However, there Is evidence to contradict this.
Wh1le he did not approach the question
head-on, Stanton found "a slight pQSitlve
correlation ... between marihuana use and
combat exposure." Wh1le thts ahows that
combat experienced troops probably were
those who had the greatest marihuana experlen~. It does not necessarily Indicate t hat
they used It whUe actually In combat.
Postel's study also indicates the same thing
but adds that the u sage came after combat
"to calm down." Treanor and Sltrlpol like-

wise found apparently Increased usage with
field-type duty; far greater numbers reported
usage at large and small "LZ forward areas"
than numbers reporting usage at "rear support areas." Reinforcing this was their further finding that an overwhelming majority
of r egular users (once weekly to once dally or
more frequently) thought that marihuana
should be permitted on ftre-basee either durIng off-duty hours or whenever the Individual chooses. Other Individuals Indicated
In person to the staff that they had used
marihuana In combat situations.
As noted above, the use of drugs at Ft.
Bragg takes place primarily In rented "pads"
away from the base and on off-duty hours.
In VIetnam and Thailand, It Is likely that
most use takes place away from established
posts because of avallablllty of drugs and
the likelihood of nondetectlon off post.
In the career context, Treanor and Skrlpol
found the highest Incidence of marihuana
usage during the first two or three years
of a soldier's m1lltary service. They a lso re ported that apparently there Is a slight Increase In usage as the first tour progresses,
but not with those on extensions.
As for VIetnam, Stanton found that the
probability was greatest that I! a man was
going to start using marihuana there, he
would begin In the first three months, or
certainly In the first six months. Conversely,
amp)letamlnes showed the opposite trend,
with more enlisted men beginning use as
their tour progressed.
D. Why drugs are being used

The ·reasons which have been presented
to us as to why drugs are being used by
young men In the m1lltary !all Into two general ca tegorles. First, there are those which
lie with the Individual himself. Second, there
are the external factors which arise In the
Individual's environment. The former are related to his ab1llty to deal with his situation
and the latter are those which place burdens
upon him which he must deal with. If his
ability to deal with environmental stresses
Is Inadequate, or If the burdens of stress
which the environment places upon him are
unusual, the Individual user will take one
of the drugs available to help him cope with
the situation.
As mentioned earlier, the habitual drug
user Is likely to be young, have a low education, come from a broken home, and have
psychological and emotional problems which
lead him t~ conftlct In whatever society he
happens to be ln. These are Individuals with
a low self-esteem who are unable to meet
most life situations. Other Individual reasons presented to us are related to the attitudes held by many of the age-group !rom
which the typical drug user comes. These
tnclude the following: ( 1) youth, being "now"
oriented, are Impatient and frustrated by
the gradual process of social change; (2)
middle-class youth reject the life goals of
affiuance and prestige held by their elders;
(3) lower-class and minority youth are Impatient and frustrated with the disparity between their goals and perceived opportunities to attain them "now," and they see the
Establishment as trying to block them; (4)
young people "get hung up somewhere along
the developmental line" toward maturity,
with a conflict developing between dependency and autonomy; (5) .drugs are a means
of acting-out behavior disapproved of by
parents or the senior generation and thus
help to concretely distinguish the "self" from
Establishment norms. The latter point seems
to be particularly valid In regards to the
troops In Germany. There we found, to a
greater degree than In VIetnam, an attitude
of division between the enlisted or drafted
lower rank soldiers and the "lifer" NCO's and
officers. Perhaps these troops are using drugs
as a means of setting themselves off !rom
the older and higher-ranking personnel who
use alcohol as their social drug.
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Other !actors He with the environment ln
which the young soldier finds hlmselt. Pressures are put upon hlm which are difficult
to cope with. Prime among these ls the lack
of sense of value which many soldiers feel
about their job. Treanor and Skrlpol found
that job dlssatlsfactlon seemed to correlate
with marihuana use. This factor was also
cited among many of the returned troops
wh o h ave several months of stateside duty
left b&!ore d ischarge. These men are given
unfulfill1ng tasks to do whlle waiting out
their time. This !actor appeared to be particularly acute In Korea and Germany where
there ls 11 ttle or no actual combat. Since the
troop units there must be combat-ready,
there Is apparently much routine work aimed
at preparing tor Inspections. A jeep driver
ln Ger many, tor example, told us that h ls
only consistent job during the three months
In adv-a nce of a unlt-wlde vehicle inspection
was to "maintain" his own vehicle. A platoon leader said the only time the morale
of his troops seemed to 11ft was when they
were preparing to go on a tough training
exercise, which was infrequently. There was
widespread grlplng about the many "make
work" jobs that troops were being given
to do.
In Vietnam, stress from combat was cited
as a factor. It was felt that some troops used
drugs, particularly ma.rlhuana, to unwind or
relax after combat. This ls accentuated when
the soldier moves from a stressful situation
to a combat lull where only routine work Is
required of hlm.
Another Important external factor Is peer
group pressure. There were lndlcatlons that
peer group pressure "to be one of the boys"
was strong. The young man, placed In a new
situation, seeking to establ1sh hls own identity, looks to join a group ln which he wlll
get approval and support. He may be trying
to feel Independent of his elders' authority
and so when the group pressures hlm to conform by trying drugs, he finds lt hard to
resist. We heard reports of Individuals being
threatened li they did not conform to drug
usage patterns but were unable to verify
any of these.
We learned of several factors which tend
to enhance the peer group situation. We
were told that the non-commissioned officers
generally dld not 11ve among their troops In
barracks areas. The older "lifer" non-commissioned officer was regarded very negatively
by the young soldiers. There was apparently
little ldentltlcatlon of the young soldier with
the older, non-commlssloned officers. Contributing to this problem ls the tact that
many of the young soldiers were coming from
a sub-culture ln clvlllan 11fe which accepts
the use of drugs. They not only would want
to perpetuate their llle style but would resent and resist those who might prevent
them from 11vlng lt.
Another factor Is the lack of acceptable
alternatives to drug use to meet either stress
or boredom. The soldier ln VIetnam has little
or no way of dealing with his frustration In
any constructive fashion. Most towns a.re otr11mits and those that are not a.re limited In
what they have to otfer. The primary activity
when they are permitted oft' the p06t Is
drinking ln the loca.l bars and meeting with
local women, most of whom are prostitutes.
In Germany, the opportunities !or meeting
local girls are somewht Improved !or white
soldiers but an obvious problem eXists for
blacks who are also barred from certain German-operated "white only" discotheques. In
Vietnam, recrea.tlona.I facUlties are generally
una.V'a.llable and are advocated a.s a.n alternative to drug abuse. However, it Is questionable 1! these would be used, since In Germany we were told that there ls a general
lack of troop interest 1n recreational a.ctlvltles ava.llable---playlng basketball, skiing,
academic courses, even three-day expensepa.ld excursions.

ln t.vuc.ra.s~ l ..... his picture Js the experience of the Air For,· !n Vietnam and especlally tn Thalla.nd. Th~ extent ot drug use
was reported to be decidedly lower among
the Alr Force men a.t the four be.ses we
visited In Thailand. The command personnel
gave evidence that both arrest and medical
statistics were much lower. The reasons
which they gave !or this lower use might be
instructive: they stated that the typical airman tends to be older than the soldier;
nearly all are high school graduates with a
significant number having some college experience; they tend to identity with the m111tary; they have good self-esteem; and they
feel that they have something to lose If they
use drugs. They also sa.ld that ln Thalland,
airmen were working a. 12-hour-a.-day, 7days-a-week schedule and were doing tasks
of a higher cal1ber. (In Thailand much of
the more mental-type tasks are performed by
local natives.) The Air Force personnel are
said to have a high sense of job satisfaction
whether they are flying or are engaged In
maintenance work: the tllght crews !eel more
worthwhlle because they are engaged ln a
task they fee! Is significant.
Other factors cited by the Air Force Inc! ude a higher ra.tllo ot officers and noncommissloned officers to enlisted personnel.
This ls sa.ld to give the alrman a. closer identification with the "Establ15hment." Also
advanced as opera.tlve to keep Air Force
usage down Is the selectivity !actor. It Is felt
by the Air Force that 1t gets a. better grade
person both In motivation and ability than
does the Army. The Alr Force has no draftees.
The Alr Force also contends that further
selectivity operatee within lts ranks ln determining tne kind of man who is sent to
Southeast Asia. Command In Thailand
claimed that the cream of the Air Force
crop was being selected to serve 1n Southeast Asia because of the Importance ot their
mission there. The Oommand ln Thailand
also attributed their reputed lower incidence
rate to the easy accesslblllty or alcohol and
local women. It appeared that while the drug
use rate might be low, the V.D. rate was
high.
Another !actor which may mllltate against
drug abuse ln some situations ls the socalled "buddy" system. The Marines and
Navy command personnel we spoke with ln
Vietnam and the Army ln Thalland felt
that the encouragement or close ties with
another lndlvldual for the purpose of mutual
support and concern helped stop drug abuse
before lt began. This ls a positive variation
at the peer-group pressure factor. In this
instance a peer situation with anti-drug use
values ls encouraged . If one lndlvldual In
the pair ls sutl'erlng unusual stress or boredom, he has another lndlvldual with whom
he can share hls burden. This gives some
relle! so that crlsls can be met without resort to drugs. We dld not have an opportunity to look at this system directly and
hence cannot give any independent evaluation. It does, however, appear to have at
least theoretical value In terms of action
to be taken to combat drug abuse.
III . THE IMPACT OF DRUG ABUSE

The stalf has attempted to access the Impact or effect which drug abuse ls having
upon the lndlvldual mllltary man, upon the
Armed Services, upon American society a.s
a whole and upon the various rei a tlonshlps
that exist between lndlvlduals and groups In
the military. We looked tor signs of breakdown which would point to remedial measures and looked tor trends or directions
which would suggest preventive actions
which might be taken.
A . The impact on the individual

The medical etl'ects or drug abuse upon
the lndlvldual ln the mllltary do not seem
to vary substantially from those reported In
the clvl!lan community. Marihuana produces a range of etl'ects which include mlld

euphoria, mlld time-space distortions, hallucinatory episodes and delusion ideation.
Those who are turning up at medical !a.cllltles with adverse reactions to marihuana are
generally those who suffer anxiety reactions
when they first use the drug. Their condition lasts for a very short period and Is
normally cleared up ln 24-72 hours. The
reaction seems to be dependent upon the
state or mind or the user rather -t han upon
the elfect or the drug. It Is likely to occur
ln an lndlvldual who has gullt feelings about
the use of marihuana and ls apprehensive
about being arrested or caught. A very few
Instances of persistent conditions, psychotic
states and violence were also reported. However, these seem to Involve lndlvlduals with
deeper, more long-standing psychologlcal
conditions of which drug abuse ls merely
one manifestation of the problem. Many of
these situations involved persons who were
using marihuana on a heavy basis every day
over a considerable period or time. The number or the nature of these cases did not seem
to be sufficient to justify a conclusion that
marihuana causes lasting psychosis or
violence ln users.
An interesting phenomenon reported was
tho "marihuana. ftoshback." A flashback Is
commonly assoclated only with LSD 'llsa.ge.
Several doctors reported that they had had
patients Who clalmed having fta.shba.cks a.tter
use only or marihuana. Theo;e fla.Sh.backs
were described as being reoccurrences of
prior experiences whlle under the J.nfiuen.ce
or the drug. They were desert bed as occurmg In moments ol stress as lf the mlnd was
lnvolunta.rlly reaching back tor a plea.sa.n.t
experience· while under Intolerable ·p ressure
ot the moment. However, the subject can apparently be brought out or the fta.shback by
someone talking to him and telllng him to
return to the present moment. There were no
reports ot deaths or permanent physical
damage !rom the use of marihuana. among
milltary personnel. The mlllta.ry medical personnel also regularly reported that ma.rihuana Is non-addlctlve ln terms or physical
dependence but that users could a.nd dld become dependent upon Its use In rthe psychologlcal or behavioral sense. Medical officers
also felt that marihuana does not In Itself
lead to the use of harder drugs. This Is supported by the Black, Owens, and Wolf!' study
which reported : "It should be noted that, although lnltlal experiences With ma.rihuana
tend to lead to continued use, iOUU"ihuana
usage does not lead most lndlviduais into experimentation with heroin. The belle! that
marihuana use Is dangerous because It predisposes toward heroin is fallacious, although It ls true that nearly all the heroin
users in the present study had also used
marihuana." Other studies also support this
conclusion and indicate that While there is
no causal relationship between marihuana
use and opiate use, most habitual opiate
users have been heavy marihuana users first.
Another Important f.a.ctor which was reported to us is that the etfects ot h&shit.h
use in Germany do not seem to be any more
severe or extreme than the etl'ects of marihuana smoked ln either the United States or
ln Vietnam. The medical stat!' of the hDspltals we visited ln Germany reported that the
cases Involving marihuana W'hJ,ch required
medical or psychological treatment were no
more severe than they had seen 1n other
locales including some In the continental
U.S. This was true even though the general
impression is that the THC content ot
hashish ls higher than marihuana alone.
The reason for this may be ln the psychological state or mlnd of the users and 1n the
settmg in which mArihuana. ls used. Also important Is the ablllty of t!he experienced
smoker of either marihuana or hashish to
control his level ot lntoxlcatlon. TO explain
further, the etl'ects or cannabis use seem to
depend to a great degree upon the subjective
state or the user. If he goes into the expert-

-7ence expecting and desiring a pleasant,
mildly euphoric e>qHJrlence with no negative
elfects and he Is doing this ln a social setting
with fellow users who are compe.tlble and
who desire the same kind o! experience, hts
expectations wlll likely be realized. In addition, because the active Ingredient Is taken
In through the lungs the quickest way to
get It Into the bloodstream, the user Is able
to control or "fine tune" his level of Intoxication. When he feels hlmsel! getting too
high he ca.n relax for a while a.nd not smoke
any more untn he starts to come down. Thls
control by the smoker enables hlm to keep
the Intoxication wlthln a manageable range
and avoid adverse reactions. Neither the
military nor the Bureau o! Narcotics W1l.S able
to supply us with an a.nalysls of the hashish
being used In Germany. It Is possible that
the product bought by the oonsumer Is so
cut wlth adultemnts that the 'I'HC content
Is lower than In straight marihuana.
One of the drugs with the greatest lmpact
upon Individuals, In medical terms Is heroin.
It Is physically addicting when taken regularly and In sufficient doses. However, we
received mixed reports as to the severity of
the addiction. Many doctors reported that
they saw very few cases o! classic withdrawal
symptoms In patients who claim the use of
heroin. The snllfers of Red Rock heroin were
reported not to have become severely addicted. This was also true or some of the
Injectors of refined heroin. However, the
heroin of 97 percent purity available In VIetnam Is particularly dangerous, Inasmuch
as It wlll likely lead to frequent occurence
of overdoses and death even In experienced
hands. Heroin use Is also likely to lead to
secondary medical complications such as
serum hepatitis !rom unsterile needles.
The opium native to VIetnam Is o! such
poor quality that In all but one case observed by an experienced mllltary psychiatrist, withdrawal symptoms were mild. The
exception Involved an Individual who had
taken 2 cc. Intravenously !our times a day
and whose abstinence-withdrawal presented
serious problems. Ar.other serious result of
opium use which occurs occasionally comes
from mixing It with marihuana In cigarettes.
This synergistic or multiple elfect of the two
drugs together can exceed the expectation of
the user and present him with a reaction
with which he cannot cope.
Deaths from heroin abuse or overdose In
VIetnam are Increasing. For the entire calendar year of 1969, only 16 deaths !rom drugs
were reported : 5 !rom chloroquine (used to
prevent malaria), 4 !rom barbltuates, 3 !rom
Darvon, 3 !rom morphine or heroin, 1 !rom
opium. During the nine-month period January-October 1970, however, the number of
deaths had already more than doubled to
34: 2 !rom chloroquine, 5 !rom barbltuates
3 from Darvon, and 26 !rom heroin-morphine:
It will be seen that heroin or morphine has
become the most frequently used lethal
agent.
One additional significant elfect which
drug abuse may have on an Individual soldier
Is the role which drugs may come to play In
his ll!e. Those Individuals who are unable
to cope with ll!e and turn to drugs may
end up relying on drugs as the core of their
lite. When this occurs the lndl vidual looes
Interest In other aspects o! his life and
devotes most o! his time to the procurement
of drugs and to their "enjoyment." This modIfication o! behavior wlll likely lead this
type of user into conflict with the military
community and consequently he Is likely
to have to !ace legal or disciplinary action.
While the Individual who becomes a heavy
user or Is psychologically or physically habituated to drug use may come to the atten tlon o! legal au thor! ties, 1t Is the conelusion o! the stalf that the lllegal!ty o!
marihuana use does not have a slgnltlcant
Impact upon the great majority o! marihuana
smokers In the rnllltary. It clearly does not

have a deterrent elfect. The Illegality or
marihuana use has been widely publicized
within and without the military. Indeed, one
of the major thrusts o! military drug education Is to stress the legal consequences of
marihuana use. We believe that the lack o!
deterrent elfect exists !or several reasons.
First Is the basic attitude o! young Americans toward marihuana use. Unlike many o!
the senior generation, many young Americans Including those In the mllltary do not
regard the use o! marlh uana as a moral q uestlon. They do not see the user o! marihuana
as a "bad" or "Immoral" person. They believe that marihuana should be legalized and
Its use lett up to the lndlvt~ual . They also
do not regard the elfects o! marihuana as
detrimental to their health or to their functioning. Many o! them regard marliluana as
a social drug to be used for relaxation and
as superior to alcohol !or this purpose because It does not leave the user with a hangover.
B. The impact upon the military

We did not find that the use of drugs has
a significant direct Impact upon the military
mission of the Armed Services. While we
were made aware o! rare, Isolated Instances
where marihuana had been used In combat
situations In VIetnam, we saw no evidence
that any mission or operation had been
jeopardized by d'rug use. VIrtually every commander to whom the Subcommittee stalf put
the question stated unequivocally and categorically that drug use has not adversely
alfected military elfectlvenes or the military
mission o! his unit.
However, It Is clear that drug abuse does
Impose an Indirect but significant burden
upon the entire military community and
organization. There Is a relationship between
drug use and manifestations or social and
behavioral disorganization such as AWOL,
sleeping on the job, !allure to appear tor
duty, disrespect, Indebtedness, and unhealthy
and unclean living habits. or these, General John J. Tolson, the Commanding General of Fort Bragg, singled out AWOL's sayIng, "It Is bound to cut down eventually In
your strength figures." although he added
that the problem at his base had not reached
such proportions "that as units they are
not capable o! performing their job."
The military community Is also affected
by the fact that the military drug user Is
often unable to pay !or his habit !rom his
normal Income. While this Is not often
troublesome In VIetnam where an drugs are
available at low prices, at continental United
States bases, crime to support drug abuse Is
a problem. Theft of Government property,
Including weapons, to support habits Is
known to occur. "Today," General Tolson
observed, "you hal'e to secure your arms
rooms and supply rooms on a scope that you
never had to do before . . . and still, If you
don't have guards actually there, thieves
wlll break Into them."
One of the most critical elfects of the
growth of drug abuse among the mill tary Is
In the growth of a counter or sub-cultur~
within the military centered around drug
use. This alfects both the individuals Involved and the mllltary community Itself.
Because smoking marihuana and hashish are
social activities, the users tend to group tc .
gether for the purpose o! drug use. The megall ty o! drug use also tends to force the user
into a particular group of his drug using
peers. This Is true whether the use Is occasional or Is on a regular basis. Part of the
mystique of smoking "grass" Is to gather
together with others to enjoy the experience.
The !llegallty of use, In elfect. cuts olf the
user from leg! tlmate sources o! support and
help with his problems-whether directly
cconected with drug use or ot another
nature- and he can, therefore, look only to
those in his peer group for emotional support.
This Is a~gravated because so many of the

young military men coming Into the services
today, do not Identify with the value system
of the senior generation. They tend to form
peer groups !or all activities rather than interact with command personnel. This Is further enhanced In the m!lltary because It Is
organized upon a hierarchial basis. In Germany more than In Vietnam the sense o! separation between the enlisted man or lower
ranks !rom the non-commissioned officets
and the commissioned officers was apparent.
In !act, In Germany we felt a great host!llty
between the one-tour soldier and the socalled "lifer." In VIetnam this was less so,
probably because o! the common sense of urgency !aced by both groups. However we
were told In several places that young troopers had a more positive relationship with
NCO's and officers of their own age. This was
attributed to the tact that these Individuals,
while occupying positions o! authority over
the troops, shared many of the same values of
the enlisted men, particularly in regard to
the smoking o! marihuana as a social activity. Some senior officers felt that some of the
junior officers right out or college share those
values and hence did not take action on
marihuana use among their troops.
Another manifestation or the sub-culture
problem is lllustrated by the example of a
~cond lieutenant at the Wlldtllcken outpost
In Germany. This platoon leader told a Subcommittee Investigator o! his tears o! venturing Into the barracks at night, where he
might be slugged I! he came upon a "pot
party" (as had happened to a fellow officer.)
The existence of a sub-culture also causes
general disruption. A squadron commander
at Bad Kisslngen, Germany, reported, "It's
not the smoking that causes m!llta.ry lnetrectlveness; It's the rarnltlcatlons of the
distribution system-the competition among
pushers who fluctuate the price, put guys
In debt. and cause disciplinary problems.
commit assaults and so on."
A more tangible impact upon the rnllitary
caused by the Increase in drug abuse is the
burden which It places upon the various elements o! the military society. Because o! the
!llegality o! drug abuse the primary burden
Is placed upon the law enforcement branches
o! the rnllitary. The allocation or manpower
and monetary resources by the provost marshal to drug problems is significant. For example, In Fiscal Year 1970, 27 per cent o!
all Army CID Investigations in Europe were
" drug-related." However, while the law enforcement branches have devoted a signifIcant amount o! their resources to stopping
drug abuse, we were universally told that
their activities were limited and not sufficient to make any significant impact upon
!llegal drug activity. Their operations are
hampered by difficulties In teaching command personnel to make legal searches and
seizures, by the length o! time necessary
for laboratory verification of !llegal drugs,
and by the dlfficul ty In establishing a legal
chain o! custody.
Because of the dlfficul ty in enforcing the
law. particularly with regard to marlh\lana
use. the law does not have any etrectlve deterrent elfect and the Impression is given to
the users that use Is tacitly accepted by command. This leads to disrespect for the law and
In elfect crates a double standard. While we
were not made aware or any cases, we do note
that the lnab!llty to enforce the law In all
cases gives rise to the possib!llty o! selective enforcement for reasons unrelated to
drug abuse.
The medical personnel in the m!lltary are
under many o! the same pressures as those
In the law enforcement branch. There has
been an Increased case load upon all military doctors. A number o! senior doctors a.re
unprepared to deal with drug abuse because
they were trained In an era when it was
much less common. The activities of the
military doctor Include many duties other
than treatment. A heavy demand Is made
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upon military doctors, particularly psychiatrists, to establish, promote, and participate
In drug abuse education programs. The military psychiatrists must make evaluations
of many troopers charged with crimes and
this Includes evaluations on the users of
drugs. In addition, military doctors are
scheduled to play a large role In the amnesty
program which will be discussed later In the
report. These functions place a burden upon
doctors who are already overburdened because of a reportedly Inordinate reduction of
medical personnel In relation to the reduction of other U.S. military personnel. This
Is a serious problem because military doctors
are faced with an Increase In drug abuse
for which there are few, It any, proven methods of treatment ava.llable.
The Increase In drug abuse has placed a
concomitant load upon all other elements
of the military structure, particularly the
command personnel and the judge advocate
staff._ They are called upon to process the
cases of accused drug users and also are an
Integral part of the military drug abuse education activities. Their specific activities will
be shown In greater detail later In the report.
C. The tmpa.ct upon Amertcan soctety

The Subcommittee staff believes that the
greatest Impact upon society as o. Whole lies
In the Integration of military drug users Into
their local communities upon release from
service. While the Indications of drug abuse
are not significantly different In the military
or In civilian society, the likelihood of Identification of drug users In the mill tary Is greater. Many drug addicts and users With maladjustment problems are being returned
from military service Identified as drug users,
but unrehabllltated. For exa.mple, administrative separations for "characterologic Ineffectiveness" rose 119 per cent from fiscal
year 1969 to fiscal year 1970, from 12,726 to
27,837. Many or these separations were for
drug use. In addition, the Veterans Administration has Indicated that there are sharp
Increases In the number of veterans, particularly under age 25, who are being treated
for drug addiction and dependency problems.
Since much or the serious drug a.buse Is
accompanied by emotional or psychological
problems requiring lengthy treatment, those
released from the military With histories of
drug use will have to find treatment sources
In civilian society. It they are unable to do
so, they will place an obvious burden on
other segments of society, particularly the
law enforcement segment. Returning veterans with drug histories also have difficulty
In finding employment. Fifty business firms
who were asked by Fort Bragg officials about
their policies toward a. man with an undesirable discharge or a. known drug abuser
replied universally that neither would be
considered favorable for employment.
IV.

HOW

IS

DRUG ABUSE

BEING

HANDLED

The question of how to handle drugs and
drug users In the military Is primarily being
met With a. law enforcement approach. This
effort Is aimed at reducing the supply of
Illicit drugs, at eliminating drug pushers and
users where detected, and at providing a.
negative Incentive for the use of drugs. Second priority Is given to treatment and rehabilitation of those using drugs. The lowest
priority Is given to activities which would
lead to reduced demand for drugs.
A. Law enforcement

The prime objective of the law enforcement efforts Is to Identify drug pushers and
traffickers and therefore halt or diminish the
supply. As noted above, there Is little Indication of concerted elforts to seek out and
arrest users or possessors. In VIetnam and
Thailand most possessors were Initially
picked up for other disciplinary violations.
In Germany command Indicated that while
most drug arrests were for possession or use,
they were not specifically looking for users.

There, the greatest number of arrests of users
were made as a result of Infiltrating a whole
group of users and not just arresting Individuals.
Because of their relatively small numbers
and for jurisdictional reasons, military law
enforcement personnel often must rely upon
other agencies In trying to shut off the supply of drugs to U.S. forces. The principal
agency relied upon for overall activities, both
here and abroad, Is the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs. Insofar as military
bases In this country are concrened, BNDD
Director John E. Ingersoll told the Subcommittee "The current 'systems' approach of
BNDD Is aimed at major Interstate and Interns tiona.I drug traffickers, and hence, the
drug problem on large military reservations
such as Fort Bragg Is left largely to the military and local authorities concerned." In
the U.S. the BNDD forces provide Information and support rather than actual enforcement for mill tary bases.
In the U.S., coordination with local and
state authorities Is essential because apart
from those pushers or dealers apprehended
on the military base, military law enforcement personnel do not have jurisdiction off
base. However, we found good two-way cooperation In gathering and supplying Information so that Illegal activities that cross
Jurisdictional lines could be halted.
In September 1970, BNDD assigned a. senior
official to a permanent liaison position With
the Department of Defense. According to
BNDD Director Ingersoll, this agent participates In all Defense Department activities
concerned With drug abuse and support to
the military needs. Overseas, a BNDD senior
agent stationed at MACV Headquarters In
Saigon works directly with the military and
a. similar agent more recently was assigned
to Frankfurt, Germany. In addition BNDD
has regional supervisors In Bangkok, Thailand and Paris, France. Other agents are located In other oountrles such as Hong Kong,
Japan, Turkey and Lebanon. These agents
work with military pollee agents In exchangIng Information and In setting up covert activities aimed at penetrating Illegal drug
groups.
In Vietnam, the BNDD agent there has
worked closely With the military and the AID
agency to establish a program to locate and
destroy marihuana crops. This has Included
the training of VIetnamese pollee In drug activities and the development of a squad of
special narcotics pollee In the VIetnamese pollee force. The program consisted of hellcopter reconnaissance flights to locate marihuana growth. After the discovery of a field,
VIetnamese pollee would move Into the area
and destroy the plants by uprooting and
burning. In 1969, some 500,000 plants were
eradicated In VIetnam under this program.
The program decreased In 1970, due to what
Ingersoll called "higher combat priorities."
He said, In addition , that the Army felt that
surveillance which had to be conducted at
low altitude and slow speed was too hazardous In areas of potential hostility. While
bounties are now paid for reporting marihuana growth, the program has not had the
same degree of success as only 68,000 plants
were destroyed through most of 1970. More
recently, the military has undertaken photo
!lights with fixed-wing aircraft that can detect growth at safe speeds and safe altl tudes.
Local cooperaltlon wl th nat! ve pollee, particularly In VIetnam, Is another activity
of the military law enforcement agencies.
This does not seem to be a successful program
because of the acceptance of opiate drug use
by tne natives, their feeling that marihuana
Is not their problem, local political Involvement and corruption, general antipathy toward cultural change, Inadequate legislation ,
and the local economic situation. In VIetnam for example, the average dally wage Is
about $.85 American . If a VIetnamese sells
two packages of prepared marihuana. cigar-

ettes at $1.50 each, he will have made over 3
times the loca.l dally wage. This makes It difficult for local enforcement agencies to take
action.
In Germany, the cooperation with local
pollee seems to be satisfactory. However,
there appears to be less than close liaison
between the CID and the BNDD agent In
Frankfurt. Local command was attempting
to overcome this problem by developing closer
ties on that level. The CID In Germany makes
great use of undercover or covert agents.
This has led to the arrest of several large
groups of pushers and users. The CID estimates that It Is Intercepting 20 percent of
the Illicit trafficking In drugs bound for
American troops In Germany.
Also used by military law enforcement authorities are marihuana sniffing dogs. On the
Asia. trip, we heard quite often about the
marihuana dogs and their value. However,
It appears that their actual use Is limited
and not very efficient. Whenever we asked to
see a dog we ran Into scheduling difficulties
or w~re told that the dogs had worked their
allotted time (usually one-half to one hour)
and were unavailable. While we suspect their
actual detect ion value, they are probably
justified by the deterrent effect their reputation has.
Because of the great amount of drugs available, particularly In Southeast Asia, we do
not feel that the law enforcement activities
mentioned above will be able to make any
significant Impact on the drug distribution
system. However, we do feel that continued
efforts aimed at pusher and major trafficking
organizations are necessary and should be
continued.
B. Education efforts

Education activities In all commands fall
Into two categories, command training and
troop education. The command training activities center around giving command personnel sufficient factual Information to enable them to oarry out their legal and disciplinary functions. Emphasis Is placed on
detection of drug use and subsequent disciplinary action. Command education Is generally carried out through Drug Suppression
Teams, consisting of medical, legal, law enforcement and perhaps chaplain officers.
Primary Importance Is placed on the Identification of drugs, drug paraphernalia, drug
use symptoms, and drug user behavior patterns. Command personnel, particularly the
junior officers and senior non-commissioned
officers are Instructed In the techniques of
proper searches and seizures, maintaining
the chain of custody, and the action to be
taken upon apprehension of offenders. While
this educational approach may be useful In
meeting the legal responsibilities of the
military, we feel that It does little toward
achieving true prevention of. drug abuse.
Education which will enable command personnel to understand the causes of drug
abuse and to dea.l with the troops before they
begin drug abuse Is generally lacking. Senior
officers a!lld NCO's appear to be the groups
most needing this type of education. General
Tolson of Fort Bragg stated, for example, "It
appeared obvious to me at the very beginning
that If we were going to get anywhere In our
education, In our dialog With the young soldier, the man we were really interested In,
there had to be a real understanding by the
senior officers and non-commissioned officers
on the drug culture and Its problems. They
were my number one target to educate."
Military regulations, Including those Issued by the DOD and the various services require that all military personnel periodically
receive orientation concerning drug abuse.
The form a!lld substance of this orientation
varies from unit to unlt and, to the knowledge of the Suboommittee staff, has never
been evaluated, except Informally, for Its
value In deterring drug use. This orientation
runs the gamut from the shoWing of a
film M1d the reading of prepared lectnre

-9materia.! to more Imaginative give-and-take
" rap" sessions. In many commands the Drug
Suppression Team does the orientation to
the troops. occasionally adding a former user
to the Team. From what llttle feedback Is
being received on the commam.d level, tWs approach was genera.! Iy not elfect! ve. This was
amrmed by Individual soldiers who complained that the presentations tended to be
too lega.J!st!c and used scare tactl!cs. It Is our
Impression that the presence of the Provost
Marshal on the team. while mer!trullous In a
situation Involving command personnel, Is
not warranted when the target gtoup Is
younger o!fi~ers or troops. In fact, the presence o! the "cop" on the ~ acts to tum
the young troops against the panel's activities. Surprisingly. this view wss accepted by
several of the Provost Marshals we talked
with.
Other ed ucat!ona.J act! vities Inc! ude radio
and T.V. spots and films. The evaluatlon of
thesse troops we ta.lked to was genera.Jly negative. The best educ81t!ona.J device we have
seen was a training road show In Germany.
TWs play was written by enlisted men in the
language and style of enlisted men and performed by enl!sted men, moot of whom had
previous show business experience. The staff
was genuinely Impressed by the emotional
Impact of this production. It UJtlllzed rock
music and visual effeets with which the
trooper could Identify. Because of this we felt
Its credib!l!ty and value was outstanding.
The credibility problem underl!es all of
the m1ll tary ed ucwt!ona.J efforts directed toward the young soldier. The con1l!ct!ng Information presented both In and out of the
m!l!tary about marihuana has undermined
the cred!b!l!ty of the better prepared and scientifically accurate efforts being made now.
However. tWs Is being overcome with valid
Information presented by medical omcers.
C. Treatment and rehabtlitation

Treatment and rehab!l!tat!on or drug
abusers In the m!l!tary cannot be discussed
without considering the so-called amnesty
program. This program. In what ever form It
may. take In any particular command, Is a
combination of legal, medical and administrative approaches to drug abuse. Its general purpose Is to provide an atmosphere In
which a drug abusing soldier can feel free to
come forth and get medical and psychological help to overcome his drug use.
Experimentation with amnesty programs In
the Army began as long ago as February,
1968, when such a program was esta.bl!shed
by the 4th Infantry Division In VIetnam.
Others were establ!shed on a command level,
all of which were In violation of existing
Army regulations. One or the most noteworthy or these Is "Operation Awareness" at
Fort Bragg which was begun In May 1970,
and undertakes to treat and rehab!l!tate the
users of hard as well as soft drugs. Regulations have now been established by the Army
and DOD encouraging the establishment of
amnesty programs. The Air Force has Indicated Its Intent to establish such a program
In a letter to Chairman Hughes. However.
the Navy and the Marine Corps have not yet
Implemented the DOD directive.
The various amnesty programs all Include
provisions which allow a drug user to make
his use known to the chaplain, doctor, or his
commander; a guarantee of no disciplinary
action If the user Is not under Investigation
and so long as he stays clean; and some treatment for his drug use. The response to the
program Is mixed. In Europe. only 140 users
per month have responded since June, 1970.
out of a total population or 185,000 Army
troops of which at least 10 percent are said
to be chronic users.
The apparent reasons for the minimal response In Europe are several: (1) !allure of
unit commanders-many or whom were !11prepared In the first place-to convey the
concept of amnesty to their troops, and
thereby signal their support or It, (2) a

widely held !eel!ng among drug users. especially hashish smokers. that there Is no
wrong-physical moral or otherwise-In such
use and hence nothing to be rehab!l!tated
from; (3) a view among the troops that there
are no Inducements to join, no Incentives,
and no rewards, coupled with t he fact that a
commanding omcer has "open-ended options"
to withdraw a man from the amnesty program at any time for any reason; (4) pressure, !nclud1ng threats or ac tual bodily harm.
by "hard" drug users and pushers against
those who may wish to seek help under the
program; (5) a reluctance on the part of
some commanders to devote the considerable
amount or time required to provide the soldier with the supportive help he needs; and
(6) t he !act that many who do participate
are subjected to harassment w!tWn their
units upon their return and that some commanders and top NCO's seem disposed to permit this activity.
The response In Vietnam Is also l!m!ted.
There, many of the medical personnel we
contacted felt that the program was not beIng received as well as It should be among
the troops because or the lack of a true guarantee or amnesty. The troops real!ze that
only the chaplain has a true confidential
communication privilege. The troops know
that the doctors are required to provide medIcal Information to command and therefore
are reluctant to come forth and reveal their
drug abuse. Another factor which may account for the apparent lack or effectiveness
Is the unavallab!ltty of adequate treatment
for users In the war zone. Our Impression Is
that the amnesty program often operates
this way in VIetnam. The heavy user comes
to omc!al attention when he seeks medical
help after an overdose or other condition related to his drug taking; he undergoes detoxification, and within a matter of days Is
returned to his unit as fit for duty; he may
or may not be offered follow-up psychiatric
assistance; and no punishment occurs unless he Is later caught taking drugs. The extent or treatment which war zone doctors
can realistically offer under t he current
manpower situation Is detoxification. There
Is an !nsumc!ent number of psychiatrists to
treat the characterological disorders which
may underly the drug abuse. Those doctors
who might otherwise be available for such
treatment are primarily engaged In activities related to Drug Suppression Teams and
In providing psychiatric eva! uat!on of accused persons !or disciplinary action.
In short, the staff feels that the amnesty
program Is based upon a sound principle, In
that It attempts to provide a system which
will get drug users Into facilities for treatment. Early evidence, however, Indicates
that the program Is not motivating the target
group to volunteer for treatment and that
even If they did volunteer, the treatment
available Is not adequate to solve the drug
problems of most users.
The medical treatment provided by the
military must be viewed In light of the attitudes of the' services toward prov1d!ng this
type of treatment. Brig. Gen. George J .
Hayes. Principal Deputy In the omce of the
Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment) told the Subcommittee that the general guideline !or medical personnel Is to retain In the military medical systems only
those Individuals who could be expected to
return to full m!l!tary duty within a reasonable time. What this means depends upon
the circumstances of each Individual case.
The staff also heard many expressions or the
positions that the military Is not a social welfare agency, that the long-term treatment
and rehabilitation of drug abusers Is In confilet with the basic military mission, and
t hat such persons should be removed from
the sphere of military !nfiuence.
However. the mill tary. particularly the
Army, appears to be experimenting and tryIng to find such cl!nlcal approaches as will

be effeet!ve w!tWn the scope or the military
missions. We saw examples or tli!s approach
In Operation Awareness at F'Qrt Bl'Sgg, and
group therapy sessions at other bases. General Hayes Indicated that as projects are developed and prove to have some emcacy. they
w!ll be Implemented elsewhere.
D. The administrative process

Or particular Importance IS the way the
problem or drug abuse and drug abusers Is
being handled In the administrative sense.
At the highest level-policy development In
DOD-the major effort to date has been the
Issuance of the DOD directive on amnesty
programs. While thls effort Is much needed,
the lag of three years from the time of the
first command level amnesty program to the
Issuance of the broad d irective Is regrettable.
Even that order Is not mandatory In that
the Individual services are authorized. but
not required, to Initiate these programs. Inasmuch as the Marine Corps and the Navy
have not Instituted an amnesty program. the
young soldier and airman are given greater
opportunities to overcome their drug problem than are the young sailor and marine.
The DOD has also recently Initiated action to get a broad understanding of the
problem. 0! Importance here are the studies
undertaken by the Mack Task Force and the
team headed by Jerome Vacek. These studIes cover DOD drug abuse policy and programs. There does not exist any service-wide
data on drug abuse at the present time, but
It Is our understanding that such a survey
Is under consideration. We noticed the lack
of hard data at all levels of command. No
hard statistics as to the extent of use or the
profile or typical users or the reasons !or
use are available on a broad scale.
At the command level, there seems to be a
growing trend toward the use of nonjudicial punishment under article 15 of the Uniform Code of M!l!tary Justice and other administrative processes, rather than courts
martial, In the handling of all but the most
serious drug cases. A general court martial
for a drug case Is almost unheard or. and
Spee!al Courts Martial and Summary Courts
are used Infrequently. A typical Illustration
Is provided by the experience In the First Air
Cavalry Division In Vietnam. In the disposition or marihuana cases. During 1969, there
were no general courts martial, only 11 summary courts martial and 43 special courts
martial. while there were 131 Article 15 cases
Involving marihuana. Nor were there any
narcotics conv!ct!ons In general courts martial In that division In either 1969 or 1970.
There seem to be several reasons for this
trend: (1) the considerable Investigation
and paperwork required to prepare for a general court martial; (2) overcrowding at the
Long B!nh jail; (3) the requirement that a
man punitively discharged be escorted back
to the United States; (4) a feeling among
Staff Judge Advocates that young omcers
sitting on administrative boards are reluctant to approve an undesirable discharge for
a drug offender; (5) a further feeling among
Staff Judge Advocat es that an Individual
must be apprehended actually In possession
In order to sustain a guilty verdict In a court
martial ; (6) Improper search and seizure
procedures and failure to maintain a proper
chain of custody by unit commanders.
Drug users with seeur!ty clearances also
present a problem. We were told that It Is
automatic to withhold security clearances
from known drug users. even those given amnesty. We are aware of no complaints with
this procedure. However. there seems to be
no effective policy concerning t he restoration of a seeur!ty clearancP. to a drug user
once he has been rehab!l!tated. When a security clearance Is withdrawn from a drug
user, It may be restored after rehabilitation,
but as one w!tnees testified, "Outliving a
reputation and proving oneself as trustworthy may be d!!ficult Indeed."
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A specla.l problem bas a.rtsen ln those overseas a.rea.s where there a.re heavy concentra.tlons or mllltary dependents, pa.rtlcula.rly
In Germany. The dependents a.re exposed to
many of the same environmental pressures
that the young mlllta.ry man. must !a.ce. The
a.va.llablllty of drugs, the confilct with the
loca.l culture, a.nd the a.bsence of alternAtive
a.ctlvltles a.re some factors cited by mlllta.ry
psychla.trlsts In Germa.ny as to why dependents might use drugs. The psychiatrists
Informed us that their effort.s a.t oomba.tlng
the problem were prlma.rlly In the educational a.rea.. They were trying to develop
curricula. !or the dependent's schools which
would provide students with the ln!orma.tlon
necessa.ry to rn&ke ma.ture decisions on drug
use. They a.lso were attempting programs of
ea.rly ldentlfica.tlon of peroona.llty problems
so tha.t they could get emotional support to
youngsters before they became victims of
drug a.buse.
The military bas a.ppa.rently resorted to
another approach In deallng with drug a.buse
among dependents. Inforrn&tlon received by
the Subcommlttee sta.tr, prlnclpa.lly letters
!rom servicemen, lndlca.tes tha.t tra.ns!er Is
a. commonly used device to remove unl!crmed fathers whose teen-a.ged dependents
have become Involved with drugs. Report.s
have been received or threa.ts to a. father's
career as being used to remove !amilles with
teena.ged users !rom an overseas post. A
clvlllan coWlSelor for the Army said he had
dealt with eleven cases since' the swnmer of
1970 by use of forced retirement and reenlistment (so that return to the United
Sta.tes Is lmmedla.te). He reported that the
tactic wa.s successful since he ha.d had no
drug problems a.mong dependent children
since September. He did acknowledge, however, tha.t ln n one of the cases was the next
duty station given full pa.rtlcula.rs a.bout the
real rea.son !or reassignment, nor was help
requested tor the !a.mlly.
V . DISCUSSION

In thls section. we shall discuss certa.ln
Issues, questions, and problem areas which
we !eel are suggested by our findings, conclusions and Impressions set out In the sections above. Whlle we recognize that the
scope of our Investigation was llmlted and
tha.t we do not ha.ve expert knowledge of
sta.tutes, p olicies, a.nd regula.tlons rela.tlng to
the Armed Services and the Veterans Admlnlstra.tlon, we believe tha.t the following
discussion wlll be useful ln forming the further consldera.tlon of these problems by the
Subcommittee, the Armed Services Committee, or the various mllltary branches.
A. Lack of hard data re lating to the extent
an.d nature of drug abuse

It Is our conclusion that there ls a definite
lack of hard, scientific data which shows the
nature a.nd extent of drug abuse ln the military. This lack has been recognized by the
DOD. It has Indicated to the Subcommittee
that a.n epidemiological study of broad scope.
wlll be underta.ken ln the nea.r future. We
believe that such a study would be helpful
!or several reasons:
1. It would show the extent and nature of
drug abuse activities of young men entering
the military service.
2. It would show the nature and extent of
drug a.buse act! vltles engaged ln by servicemen while members of the Armed Forc643 . It would lndlca.te the personal characterIstics and the external circumstances common
to Individuals who abuse drugs.
4. It would Indicate those personal characteristics and external circumstances which
are common to Individuals who retrain from
c r cease using drugs.
This Information would be extremely valua.ble In determining the more precise alloca.tlon of resources and the design of programs
to meet specific needs a.s revea.led In the study.
We urge tha.t this study be begun as soon as
possible and on a.s broad a basts as possible.

B . Issues relating to the prevention. of drug
abuse

The discussion of the factors rela.tlng to
the causes of drug abuse suggested two approaches to the programs designed to prevent
drug abuse In the military: one Is rela.ted to
oha.racterlstlcs d! Individual drug users and
the other concerns the clrcurnsta.nces which
a.re present ln the user's environment.
1. Prevention-Individual Factors
In the sections concerning the characterIstics of the typical user and the reasons why
young soldiers engage In drug al>use, some
common personal factors seemed to be present. There were a.lso Indications of attributes
common to the hea.vy or chronic user who
was most llk.ely to come to the attention or
comma.nd either medically or legally. These
common attributes Included: age 19- 22, ra.nk
E-4 or below, unmarried, low educa.tlon,
draftee or non-career oriented enlistee, !rom
a. broken home, and personality or characterological disorders. The most recent studies
which have been done to date Indicate that
a significant proportion of the drug abusers
being Identified In the Army ha.d engaged In
drug abuse before entering the military, Including some Individuals who ha.d used
heroin. For example, the survey among 82nd
Airborne Division troops showed: " Approximately one ha.l! of the marijuana users (who
represented 64 percent of the total sample)
began use prior to coming Into the Army
whUe approximately 4 out of 10 of the opiate
users (who represented 17 per cent d! the
total sample) first used opiates prior to entering the Army. Further, there ls evidence
that a majority of those In the sample that
are heavy drug users began their drug ha.'blt
In civilian life."
This suggests that the Incidence and Impact of drug abuse In the mllltary could possibly be reduced slgnlfica.ntly by eliminating,
In the Induction process, those lndlvduals
whose personal characterstlcs Indicate that
they are "drug-prone" or who are most at
rlsk when exposed to drugs. Obviously, this
approach Is not without dltllculty. Some candidates !or lnduclilon may attempt to use
alleged drug abuse to escape their obllga.tlon.
Others may attempt to conceal their habits
so that they may Join hoping to be cured. A
specla.l problem Is prooented by the drug
a.buser In civilian life who enlists In the
Army when given the choice of mllltary servIce or jail by hls loco.! Judge.
In addition, there are few, I! any, reliable
tests to determine actual drug use or those
most likely to become drug a.bllS(>rs. The
medical officers at Induction stations now
consider Individuals under the ''whole man"
concept and try to weigh all relevant !actors
In each case to determine an Individual's
potentia.! as a military man. This Is clearly a
difficult task.
An additional problem arises In determining what should be done with an Individual If he Is rejected at the Induction
level as a known drug user or as likely to
become one. This Individual, whlle not a
rt.sk to the mlllta.ry community, rn&y present
difficulties for the civilian community. So far
as the Subcommittee staff could determine
there Is no forma.! mecha.nl&m !or referring
to ctvlllan trea.tment a.gencles those rejected
a.t the Induction station who rn&y doo.lre
trea.tment. In contrast, however, under
regulations governing the operation of these
stations, a candidate !or Induction who Is
Infected with venereal disease Is required to
obta.ln treatment at a U.S. Health Service
HospltaJ. before reporting back to the station
for further exarnlnatlon.
In view of the foregoing, we recommend
that the Alcoholism a.nd Narcotics Subcommittee or the Anned Services Committee lmmedla.tely undertake discussions with the
rntllta.ry to determine the feasibility of

taking appropriate action based on the
following questions:
a.. Whether the Armed Forces should give
special priority to developing reliable
methods of Identifying drug abusers and
potentia.! drug abusers a.t the Alrmed Forces
Examining and Entrance Stations and elsewhere In the military system.
b . Whether a study should be undertaken
to determine lf eilltrance exa.mlnatlons can
and should be made more effective ln screenIng out drug abusers and those who a.re prone
to drug abuse. Such a study might Include
an a.n.a.lysls of the techniques which can be
used to screen such lndlvldua.ls, a. cost-benefit a.na.lysls of such techniques, and rocommendatlons of those techniques which might
be successfully used by the Armed Forces.
c. Whether Individuals who are rejected
!or service In the Armed Forces because
ot drug 1\buse or drug dependence should,
wlth thet'r consent, be referred to appropriate civilian prevention and trea.tment facilities. Such a determination should Include
e. consideration of the resources available In
the clvllla.n community at large.
d. Whether the Armed Forces should establish a system !or evalua.tlng the performance of each AFEES station In screenIng out drug abusers. Such a. system might
seek to Identify those AFEES stations where
significant numbers of Individuals have been
admitted to service with undetected drug
a.buse and drug dependence problems which
subsequently Interfere with their military
performance.
2. Preven.tion.-En.viron.men.talfactors

In earlier sections, there was considerable
d iscussion of environmental factors which
might lead to or foster drug abuse among
military personnel. These Included: lack of
satisfying work; boredom; stress !rom combat; peer group pressure; developmen t of a
sub-culture organized around values antithetical to the mllltary; a dlvlslon between
young enlisted men and "lifer" NCO's and
officers; and the lack or acceptable social and
recreational alternatives.
In addition, a number of !actors were cited
by the Air Force, particularly ln Thailand,
as contributed to a low drug abuse rate.
These Included better ca.llber of personnel
(higher education, better motivation); hlgh
sense of job satisfaction; high ratio of officers and non-commissioned officers to enlisted personnel; no draftees; selectivity In
recruiting; and acceptable recreational alternatives. Another !actor which was suggested
as tending to prevent or reduce the desire
to participate In drug abuse wa.s the " buddy
system."
While these we~e presented to the staff as
possible !actors affecting the rate of drug
abuse, we do not feel that we have sufficient
Information concerning these assertions to
make any firm recommendation as to their
validity. However, they do point the way to
possible approaches which would reduce the
motivation to take drugs and thereby reduce the demand !or Illegal drugs.
Therefore, we recommend further study
of these !actors, both positive and negative,
to evaluate the Impact they h ave upon drug
abusers and whether positive alternatives
can be developed to reduce the Impact or
negative elements.
C. PREVENTION-EDUCATION

The education activities which the various
military branches have been presenting fall
Into two ca.tegorles, command tra ining and
troop education. As noted above, primary
emphasis Is being placed upon command
training, the purpose of which Is to enable
the command cadre to carry out legal and
dlsclpllna.ry functions. Education which
would enable command personnel to understand the causes of drug abuse and to deal
with troops before they begin drug a.buse Is,
In the opinion of sta.ff, generally lacking and
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should be strengthened. In addition, It Is our
Impression that present educational activities directed toward the troops themselves
are not effective In preventing the desire to
use drugs and should be evaluated.
In view of the foregoing, we believe that
the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics or the Armed Services Committee Immediately undertake discussions with the
military to determine the feasibility of taking
appropriate action based on the following
questions:
I. Whether to shift the priority of dru8
abuse education from command training to
troop education.
2. Whether a more Intensive troop education program and permitting Individual participation, would be effective In reducing
drug abuse In the mllltary.
3. Whether "Drug Abuse Suppression
Teams" with expertise In effective educational
techniques and a knowledge of legal, medical, and social ramifications of drug abuse,
are a useful tool In meeting the drug challenge.
D. PREV'E NTION-LAW ENFORCEMENT

The primary question In the law enforcement field relates to the relative priority of
law enforcement activities as compared to
prevention programs aimed at reducing the
motivation to use drugs. As noted above, the
current laws relating to the use or drugs
(particularly marijuana} and their enforcement do not seem to be providing any significant deterrent effect. Other factors favor
a shift away from a basically law enforcement
approach, particularly In Southeast Asia.
The control of the supply and distribution
of drugs under the ecological, economic, and
political conditions In those countries Is
difficult. Director Ingersoll testUied that he
thought American troops would be gone from
Southeast Asia before sny significant changes
were made there. The total amount or drug
supplies which can be stopped seems to be
limited, regardless of m anpower limitations.
This was recognized by the CID of the 4th
Infl,'ntry Division when It provided the main
Impetus In establishing Its amnesty program
In early 1968.
Specific problems affecting the legal and
law enforcement process of the . military In
dealing with drug abuse Include: Improper
search and seizures by unit command personnel; !allure to maintain proper chains of
custody In preserving evidence; and delays In
getting laboratory a.na.lysls of suspected
drugs. We suggest that further emphasis be
placed upon developing procedures and trl'lnlng programs which would eliminate these
problems.
E. PROCESSING OF DRUG ABUSERS--TREATMENT
ANO REHABU..ITATION

The Issue of treatment and rehabilitation
of drug abusers Is the most complex and difficult of all those dealt with In ' our Investigation. There can be little doubt that drug
abusers, especially those who are addicted or
dependent on drugs, should receive medical
trea.tmen t whether they are In the clvlllan or
the mllltary community.
However, the questions as to how that
treatment Is to be delivered to the abuser,
by whom It Is to be delivered, the nature of
the treatment necessary, and under what circumstances It should be delivered have not
been definitively answered whether In the
context of the military or civilian communities. As regards the drug abuser In the mUIta.ry, the most difficult question Is to what
extent, I! any, should the military treat a.
drug abuser found In Its ranks. As previously
noted, the Armed Forces have taken the
position that they should undertake treatment of a. drug user In the military only I!
he can be restored to duty within a. "reasonable" time. The general position of medical
practitioners and command personnel In the
military Is that It Is not consistent with the

mission or the military to undertake longterm treatment and rehabllltatlon.
The trestment which Is now provided In
the military services seems to be limited In
scope and duration. The closest approach to
long te\-m rehabilitation In the military Is
"Operation Awareness" at Fort Bragg where
the program Is 12 weekS long. This experimental program Is attempting to deal with
hard narcotic addicts as well as those dependent on soft drugs.
Under the amnesty program, the treatment provided Is mln.lma.l. It does not a.ppea.r to ~ro beyond detoxlflca.ttan, 1! necessaa:Y, and short -<term psyc!wthera.py or group
th.erapy. This Is particularly true for cases
a.rl.slng under the program ln the Vletna.m
War zone. There the oondlll!ons under whlch
treatment Is given make It extremely difficult
to deal with any thing other th.am the acute
effeots of drug abuse. It would be nearly
Impossible to provide trestment of underlying psychological disorders while m.alnta.lnlng an Individual In his unit under com.balt
ormdl ttans. Anatther dlfficul ty with trea.tment In the war zone Is that any kind or
tre01tment which would remove a.n Individual
from oomb&t oond1tl0Il6 would tempt ma.ny
Individuals 100 take advan~e of the program
solely for the purpose of avoiding combat.
This would be pa.rtloula.rly tJrue l!, as some
have proposed. a oentiral treatment fa.clllty
were ·to be esta.bllshed there. some medical
personnel have also pointed out that a. centralized !acUity Is not satisfactory from a
therapy point of view In that It removes
the pa.ttent !rom hls natura..! envlroounent
a.nd Increases the difficulty of relntegra.tlng
him Into e.ny k!lnd of mlllta.ry unit.
Adding to the complexity or the trea.tment pro•b lem Is the Issue of whether or not
there a.re adequate Tesouroes within th.e military to provide treatment, even under the
limited responslbllltles a.ssumed by the
Armed Services toda.y. There a.re several raetors which should be considered at this
point :
1. The true extent of the dl'ug abuse problem Is unknown.
2. There Is a. current sh0Tta.lr8 of tradned
medical and men ta.l hea.!Jth pensonnel.
3. The rota.tlon of mlllta.ry ~nel usu·
ally mlll•tateB a.g&lnst the OveT!&p or key
people and the retention of personnel 1n a
single pOS!ltlon long e.ru>ugh to !ully develop
any treatment progTa.m.
As to the sho.nta.ge o! tra.lned me<J;tcaJ and
menta.! health pe<!Wnnel, the ste.ff was told
thlllt In September, 1970, there were only 13
Army psychlartml.sts 1n Vietnam, a.nd only
one Army Md one Air Faroe psych.la.tr.tst In
Thailand. In Eu~ope we were told thlllt the
ATmy has more psych1ata'lsts thflln In Vletnam, on the ground that there Is a grea.ter
spread of lnd.lvtdual Installations In Europe.
The present normal tour of duty for phystclans and psychiatrists In the Army Is
three years a.t one duty sta.tlon except In
Vietnam where It ls one yea~r. We were told,
however, tha.t DOD was oontempla.tlng recommending a flre-yea.r normal tow- or <!lheee
personnel.
Another Issue relating to treatment and reha.bllltatlon Is whether confldentla.llty of
communications should be preserved In all
tre'atment and reha.blllta.tlon rela.tlonshlps
Involving the drug user who elects to seek
asslsta.nce under a.n amnesty program.
The Depa.rtment or Defense did not address this Issue In Its Directive 1300.12. Nor
did the Army In AR 600- 32. However, the
Alr Force, ln Its amnesty progra.m, will grant
"certain limited privileged communication
rights."
Under current military practice, there Is
generally no gua.rantee of prlvlleged communt.;a.ttons between doctor and patient. This
Is based upon the Department or De!ense
position that "a mlllta.ry service must have ,
or be able to obtain, full l&nd complete Information at a.ny time a.s to the physical or

mental capacity of Its members. A rule providing otherwise would place the military
In the untenable position of ha.vlng little
cr no ldea as to the physical or mental conditions of the members of the service."
Obviously, this rule gives rise to conflict
when the rubject matter or the prtvlle!red
communication Is also lllega.J. It becomes particularly a.cute In the context of the amnesty
progra.m pollcy of encouraging drug users to
seek treatment. This confltct wa.s repeatedly
cl ted a.s discouraging drug users from seeking
help even though they were otherwise motivated to seek lt. The fear o( prosecution on
the basis of Information divulged In the
course of treatment has apparently not been
overcome by the guYantee of amnesty esta.bllshed In the progra.m.
Medical personnel did point out, however,
that "often In treatment and reha.bllltatlon It
Is very lmpOTtant that ceTtaln people who
are In Important social positions be notlfled
hl order to enlist a.sslsta.nce In helping someone. So In tha.t sense strict confldentlallty
may not be something you wa.nt to ma.lnta.ln, but It Is the lllegallty which poses a
major problem."
AI though the a.mnesty policy does preclude prosecution upon the basis of Information divulged by an Individual when seeking
medical a.sslstance under the program, It Is
clear that It Is not Intended to prohibit the
use or such lnforma.tlon for such a.drnlnlstratl ve action as removal !rom ftytng sta.tus
or the revocation or a security clearance. The
Air Force a.lso Indicates tha.t such ln!oTmB.tlon could be used under Its a.mnesty progra.m to admlnlstra.tlvely discharge a drug
user under honorable oondl tlons. It also has
lnd,.lcated that In the case of a. temporary
suspension OT dlsqua.llflca.tlon from flying
status, a. one year period o! abstinence would
be the minimum time before restora.tlion of
such status.
In the Army the security clearance or a
drug a.buser Is withheld automatically upon
dlsclos:.~re. While this withdrawal Is characterized as temporary, no specific guidelines
have been established to permit relnstltutlon
of the clearance.
It should be noted that If the drug abuser
does not voluntarily seek help under an amnesty program there might be no knowledge
of the drug abuse and therefore the Individual would retain flying status, security,
clearance, etc.
The admlnlstrat1 ve processing or known
drug abusers whether those participating In
amnesty programs or those a.pprehended for
drug abuse violations presents several other
Issues.
A major question raised by the administrative processing of drug abuse offenders,
whether by Article 15 action, administrative
action, or through judicial action, Is the relationship between the administrative action
and treatment and rehabllltatlon. Rega.rdless
or whether punishment or separation of a
drug abuse offen<.ler Is administered, the offender In ma.ny situations has physical or
mental health problems related to his use
of drugs. Therefore consideration must be
given to providing treatment or reha.bllltatlon to the offender as well as to the Individual who volu'ltarllv seeks asslsta.nce under
the amnesty program or otherwise. Factors
which should be given consideration In determining the proper disposition or an orfender lncl11de:
I. Whether It Is a first offense.
2. The se\'erlty o! the offense (pushing
vs. use}.
3. The wllllngness or the offender to accept treatment.
4. The degree of physical addiction or psychological dependents upon the drug.
5. The evaluation or the severity o! any
underlying psychological problems.
6. The length or service or the offender and
the length o! time left In his current obllgatlon.
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Another problem arises In the carses or
those who have actually been separated !rom
the military !or drug offenses. We were presented With some evidence that those who
are separated with n.nyth1ng less than an
honorable discharge are subjected to disCrimInation when re-entering clv111an l!fe. This
can be particularly dlmcult !or the drug orfender as he has characterological problems
which make him 11. marginal Individual Ln society anyway. A discharge other than honorable pl.u:es one more barrier In his way. However, It was the position o! some rnllltary
personnel that the discharge Is an assessment
ot the job performance o! the Individual In
his military !unction and therefore no modification In pol!cy would be appropriate to
alleviate the burden of the drug offender.
Another ls1ue worthy of mention Is the
mJl!tary dependent and drug abuse. The primary pl.u:e where we came Into contact With
dependent use was In Germany. We heard
reports or admJnistratlve a.ctlon (early retirement, transfer, loss of quarters) being
taken against a parent because o! his child's
use of drugs. We learned ot drug education
and prevention efforts beLng made by dependent school<; and medical personnel. We
would recommend, however, that the problem of drug use among dependents and programs designed to combat that problem be
given further study and evaluation.
Because o! the Interrelationship between
treatment and rehabilitation, and admlnistratl ve processing of drug abusers, we believe
that the Subcommittee on Alcohol!sm a.nd
Narcotics or the Armed Services Committee
should lmmedlat~ly undertake d!sc!IBslons
With the Inil!ta.ry to determine the feasibilIty of taking appropriate action based upon
the folloWing questions:
1. Whether It Is feasible !or the Defense
Department to establ!sh a comprehensive, Integrated, and mandatory policy under which
servicemen who are drug dependent or drug
addicts are provided treatment and rehab111tatlon wl thln the military service.
2. Whether It Is feasible for the Defense
Department to er,tabl!sh a program whereby
a drug offender who desires medical treatment ca.n receive It Within the military.
3. Whether a program can be developed
whereby servicemen Identified ~ drug dependent persons or drug addicts can be separated trom the military and provided With
treatment, tr necessary, In the clvll1an community.
4. Whether It Is feasible to consider such
.u:tlons as postponement o! trial or d!sclpl!na.ry proceedlngT3, suspension of sentence, or
other devices commonly used In clv!Jia.n
courts, a.s alternatives or In l!eu of prooecutlon o! drug dependent persons or drug addicts.
5. Whether absolute confidentlal!ty In
privileged· communications Is necessary or
feasible within the meaning of amnesty programs.
6. Whether guldel!nes can be developed to
permit the restoration o! flying status, security clearance or other prlv1leged status,
Within a reasonable time after rehab111tatlon.
7. Whether treatment and rehab111tatlon
efforts should be carried out In central treatment f.u:ll!tles, Within the context of a local
unit or both.
8. Whether drug dependent persons or
drug addicts should be granted non-punitive discharges and be el!glble !or all or some
veterans benefits.
9. Whether the Veterans AdmJnlstratlon
should give priority to Increasing Its capabll!ty to care !or drug dependent persons or
drug addicts.
10. Whether mJlltary medical manpower
can be allocated so that continuity Is preserved In treatment and prevention programs.
11. Whether It Is feasible to allocate greater
manpower and monetary resources to all ele-

ments of the millta.l}' which deal With drug
abuse.
12. Whether It Is feasible to gl ve priority to
peer group participation and the use of exaddicts In prevention, treatment and rehabilItation programs.

Mr. MANSFIEI.J). Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. HUGHES. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIEI.J). Mr. President, I
commend the distinguished Senator from
Iowa for once again taking the initiative
in a field which is of transcendent importance.
We have been hearing a great deal
from congressional sources about the rise
in the drug problem in Indochina, and
perhaps in Southeast Asia as a whole,
and we~ becoming aware of what this
means to us in more ways than one.
I recall the interest of the distingUished Senator from Iowa in going down
to Fort Bragg some monthS ago to look
into the drug treatment program as it
affected, I believe, members of the airbome·troops at that base. If I recall correctly, the Senator was very pleased with
the attitude of the commanding officer
there, and the attempts which he was
making to try to bring about rehabilitation of those who had become addicted
to drugs-many of them to the hard-type
heroin and the like.
The Senator bas now become the chairman of a committee which will be able
to look into this matter more thoroughly.
I anticipate that the kind of job which
the distinguished Senator from Iowa will
do will be one which is long overdue,
which will be welcomed by the Senate
and the country as a whole, and which
will help to point a way toward a solution of this problem, which is growing
not better but worse with the passage of
time, and which will affect not only the
military, as it does at the moment, but in
time will affect the population as a whole.
Again I commend the distinguished
Senator for his initiative in this most important and delicate field .
Mr. HUGHES. I thank the Senator
from Montana .
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I wish to join with the distinguished
majority leader in commending the
thoughtful and able Senator from Iowa
for his work in regard to the drug problem in our Armed Forces, I do not know
of any subject more important for congressional consideration than the accelerated use of drugs in the Armed
Forces. It presents a grave danger to our
Armed Forces. As a Senator and as a citizen, I am very glad that the conscientious, dedicated, and able Senator from
Iowa is cba.i.ring a committee to delve
deeply into this problem.

